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Abstract
In 2017, the The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) – a set of 
function-based regulations applicable to Arctic and Antarctic waters, with the goal of increasing 
awareness and improving safety for ship operations in polar waters – entered into force. This arti-
cle examines the Polar Code’s contribution to the establishment of new standards and guidelines, 
with the problem under discussion being the extent to which the function-based regulations contribute 
to enhancing safety for ship operations in the Arctic, given that maritime activities in these waters are 
associated with great risks and uncertainties. The article gives a historical review, elucidating the back-
ground leading to the development of the Polar Code, followed by a review of the structure and 
key principles of the regulations. Further, ship traffic in the Arctic region and those subject to the 
Polar Code are examined, followed by a summary of findings and experiences from three survival 
exercises (SARex I, II and III), performed in northern areas around Svalbard between 2016 and 
2018. The article concludes that safe ship operations depend on those subject to the regulations 
conducting thorough operational risk assessments that cover all potential hazards, in order to mit-
igate sufficiently. Further, the presence of authorities is found to be crucial, with validation of the 
adequacy and the dimensioning of the implemented measures being of the essence.
Keywords: Arctic shipping; risk management; emergency response; regulatory governance
Responsible Editor: Øyvind Ravna, Faculty of Law, UiT The Arctic University of 
Norway, Tromsø, Norway
Received: March 2020; Accepted: June 2020; Published: August 2020 
Espen Engtrø, Ove Tobias Gudmestad & Ove Njå
48
1 Introduction
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) came into force 
on 1 January 2017, to increase awareness and improve safety for ship operations in 
polar waters, covering both the Arctic and the Antarctic.1 The function-based regu-
lations constitute a continuation of existing regulations, made mandatory under the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), applica-
ble to all waters. The goals for implementing the Polar Code are “to provide for safe 
ship operation and the protection of the polar environment by addressing risks pres-
ent in polar waters and not adequately mitigated by other instruments of the Organi-
zation”.2 The problem discussed in this article is the extent to which the function-based 
regulations contribute to enhancing the safety of ship operations in the Arctic, given that 
maritime activities in these waters are associated with great risks and uncertainties. The 
Polar Code’s risk-based approach to determining the scope of ship operations and its 
holistic approach to reducing identified risks3 implies industry self-regulation as its 
main principle. We argue that self-regulation demands strong professional integrity 
and high levels of competence, both from those subject to the regulations and the 
authorities, and from the recognized classification societies issuing the Polar Ship 
Certificate. The topic addressed is risk regulation at the international and governing 
levels, with complex issues handled by a variety of industries and involved parties; 
our main concern is the capability to handle major emergency situations in cold 
climate areas.4
The article examines the processes which led to the Polar Code before evaluating 
implementation and enforcement of the regulations. It starts with a historical review 
that elucidates the work leading to the Polar Code. A review of the structure and key 
principles of the regulations follows. Then ship traffic in the Arctic region and those 
subject to the regulations are examined. This is followed by a summary of experi-
ences and lessons learned from three Arctic search and rescue (SAR) exercises.5 
Then we discuss new guidelines under development for ship operations in the Arc-
tic Region in the wake of the Polar Code. Finally, a systematic collection of data 
on related matters has been carried out, enabling us to evaluate how practices are 
evolving. 
The issues raised in this article were first addressed by the authors in a paper pub-
lished in Norwegian;6 however, the text has been expanded considerably and updated 
with information about the implementation of regulations since 2018.
2 The Polar Code’s historical development 
In 1989, the oil tanker, Exxon Valdez, ran aground near the coast of Alaska, becom-
ing one of history’s largest environmental disasters.7 The accident subsequently 
raised public awareness, and an international process was initiated, in which several 
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countries strove to establish and agree upon international regulations and guidelines 
for ship traffic in polar waters.8 Maritime activity in these waters was regulated by 
international laws and the laws of coastal states with territorial sovereignty, which 
could be contradictory.9 Despite the additional challenges represented for ships 
operating in polar areas, many operators did not consider the added risks associated 
with cold climate operation.10 
In 1991, IMO received a proposal from its member state Germany to include 
rules in SOLAS regarding ice strength for ships intended for polar voyages, in accor-
dance with the rules of a recognized classification society.11 The Maritime Safety 
Committee in IMO relayed the proposal to the subcommittee for Ship Design 
and Equipment, which handed the work to an informal external working group, to 
develop proposed guidance regarding technical concerns for ships operating in polar 
waters.12 This group, led by Canada, worked according to certain key strategies:13 
the guidelines should be based on existing IMO regulations and standards for safety, 
environmental protection and training; an equal focus should be placed on safety for 
human life and environmental considerations; the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for polar waters should be used as legal framework; 
and competence and knowledge from Russia, Canada and the Baltic states on ice 
navigation and regulatory regimes should be taken into consideration. 
In 1998, the subcommittee for Ship Design and Equipment received a draft of 
the International Code of Safety for Ships in Polar Waters, but changes to the draft were 
made after submissions from several states and interest groups. Among other issues, 
the Antarctic was removed as a geographical area, and any contradictions to inter-
national laws were removed.14 A new revision, Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic 
Polar Waters, was drafted and, after minor modifications, approved in 2002, named 
the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters. These recommended 
guidelines were amendments to the SOLAS convention but not made mandatory.15 
During the next two years, ship traffic increased around the South Pole, and the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting requested that IMO amend the Guidelines for 
Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters to be applicable to the ice-covered waters 
around the Antarctic.16
In 2007, the cruise ship, MV Explorer, hit the underwater part of an iceberg and 
eventually sank off the South Shetland Islands in the Antarctic with 100 passen-
gers and a crew of 54, all rescued.17 The accident placed further focus on estab-
lishing joint guidelines, applicable to the Arctic and the Antarctic,18 and, in 2009, 
IMO approved the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters. The United States, 
Norway and Denmark argued that requirements should be mandatory, and a pro-
cess was initiated to finalize the guidelines by 2012, but disagreements amongst 
nations and interest groups contributed to a postponement of the implementation 
date.19 It was particularly difficult to reach a consensus on certain requirements 
regarding environmental protection.20 In 2012, IMO postponed the work, as agree-
ments addressing environmental requirements were not reached.21 IMO and certain 
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member states of the Arctic Council were criticized for being reactive in the develop-
ment and implementation of the new guidelines, and the shipping and shipbuilding 
industries were accused of showing a lack of support for adhering to the provisions in 
the guidelines, possibly due to infrastructure and technological constraints.22 How-
ever, in 2014, draft guidelines were finalized, and produced as amendments to the 
SOLAS convention. The following year the guidelines were created as amendments 
to the MARPOL convention.23 Finally, in 2017, the Polar Code came into force.
3 Structure and key principles of the Polar Code 
The Polar Code consists of two parts: Part I contains provisions on safety mea-
sures, made mandatory under the SOLAS convention; Part II contains provisions on 
measures to prevent pollution, made mandatory under the MARPOL convention. 
Furthermore, Parts I and II are divided into two parts, with part one (I-A) being 
mandatory and part two (I-B) consisting of guidelines and recommendations to the 
mandatory provisions. In the following, provisions on safety measures (Part I) are 
examined; these apply to passenger ships carrying more than twelve passengers or 
cargo ships with a gross tonnage of 500 or more, engaged in international voyages.24 
The requirements in the Polar Code are mainly function-based, meaning they are 
related to risk factors in operating areas, such as ice conditions and temperatures.25 
Shipowners must therefore carry out operational risk assessments of areas of oper-
ation, which, together with operational capabilities and limitations, shall be doc-
umented in the ship’s Polar Water Operation Manual (PWOM), to be carried on 
board the vessel.26 The PWOM shall include or refer to procedures to be followed 
in normal operations and in order to avoid encountering conditions exceeding the 
ship’s capabilities. The PWOM shall also contain specific procedures to be fol-
lowed in the event of an incident, if conditions are encountered which exceed the 
ship’s specific capabilities and limitations, in addition to procedures for icebreaker 
assistance.27
Under the safety measures (Part I) of the Polar Code, ten references are made 
to standards and guidelines for ice types, ship structure, machinery installations, 
voyage-planning and operational assessments.  The guidelines for operational assess-
ments are based on a mechanistic risk analysis process; estimated risk values  are 
compared with risk acceptance criteria, to optimize solutions. As no guidelines have 
been issued for cold climate, the analytical techniques must be adapted to the envi-
ronmental conditions. The prescriptive standards for construction referred to in the 
regulations were developed over time, based on empirical models aligned with reg-
ular norms for construction (load, structural response and safety margins). These 
standards and guidelines have not been modified since the application of the Polar 
Code, although “Requirements regarding Polar Class”, sections I1 and I2, were revised 
in 2016.
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3.1 Goal-based standards 
A goal-based standards approach was used in the development of the Polar Code,28 
regarding the design and construction of ships and equipment, operational conditions 
and training, and protection of the environment.29 Goal-based standards comprise at 
least one goal, functional requirement(s) associated with that goal, and regulation(s) 
which meet the functional requirement(s), including the goal.30 The goal-based stan-
dards approach is seen in the following chapters of the Polar Code: PWOM (Ch. 2), 
ship structure (Ch. 3), subdivision and stability (Ch. 4), watertight and weather-tight 
integrity (Ch. 5), machinery installations (Ch. 6), fire safety/protection (Ch. 7), life- 
saving appliances and arrangements (Ch. 8), safety of navigation (Ch. 9), communica-
tion (Ch. 10), voyage planning (Ch. 11), manning and training (Ch. 12). 
As an example, the goal-based standards approach for life-saving appliances and 
arrangements is “to provide for safe escape, evacuation and survival”,31 where the 
functional requirement for evacuation is that “All life-saving appliances and associ-
ated equipment shall provide safe evacuation and be functional under the possible 
adverse environmental conditions during the maximum expected time of rescue”.32 
One regulation for evacuation states that “Ships shall have means to ensure safe evac-
uation of persons, including safe deployment of survival equipment, when operating 
in ice-covered waters, or directly onto the ice, as applicable”.33 The functional goals 
in the Polar Code facilitate interpretations and discretionary assessments, and those 
subject to the regulations must gain insight into significant environmental loads and 
structural responses, requiring an extensive systemic understanding.
Although the requirements in the Polar Code are distinctly functional, descriptive 
guidelines for the analytical processes are provided. The regulations use precise defi-
nitions, in addition to definitions referred to in SOLAS and MARPOL, which are 
not rendered in the Polar Code. Those subject to the regulations must therefore be 
familiar with the existing IMO regulations. The Polar Code specifies several explicit 
sources of hazards, such as icing, low temperatures and remoteness,34 guiding the 
analytical approach. The definitions habitable environment, maximum expected time of 
rescue and Mean Daily Low Temperature (MDLT) are significant for design and solu-
tions and are determinative in the dimensioning processes. The most concrete and 
descriptive requirement concerns time of rescue, where “Maximum expected time 
of rescue means the time adopted for the design of equipment and system that pro-
vide survival support. It shall never be less than 5 days”.35
3.2 Polar Ship Certificate
New ships constructed after the introduction of the Polar Code (1 January 2017), 
entitled to operate in the application area of the regulations, are required to obtain 
a valid Polar Ship Certificate. Ships constructed before that date, operating in the 
same areas, are required to obtain the Polar Ship Certificate by the first intermediate 
or renewal survey, whichever occurs first, after 1 January 2018.36 The Norwegian 
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Maritime Authority (NMA) issues the Polar Ship Certificate for ships flagged by the 
Norwegian Ordinary Ship Register. The issue of certificates for ships in the Norwe-
gian International Ship Register is delegated to recognized classification societies on 
behalf of the flag state the ship is registered under.37 
The Polar Code’s geographical area of application in the Arctic is shown in 
Figure 1 below. In the Antarctic, the regulations are applicable at the 60th parallel 
south. Different industries and parties with activities in these waters are subject to 
the Polar Code’s requirements.
Figure 1. Maximum geographical extent of the Polar Code’s area of application in the Arctic.38
4 Ship traffic in the Arctic Region
The receding sea ice in the Arctic is enabling an increase in shipping across the 
northern polar region, connecting Asia and Europe by trans-Arctic routes along 
(Figure  2): the Northeast Passage (NEP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), 
encompassing the route along the Norwegian and Russian Arctic coasts; the North 
West Passage (NWP), which follows Canada’s northern coastline; and the Transpo-
lar Sea Route (TSR), which bisects the Arctic Ocean through the North Pole.39 In 
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addition, the Arctic Bridge Route (ABR), a shipping route linking the Arctic seaports 
of Murmansk (Russia) and Churchill (Canada), could develop into a future trade 
route between Europe and Asia.40
Figure 2. Shipping routes in the Arctic Region.41
Ship traffic can be divided into four main categories:42
1. Oil tankers or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tankers/condensate tankers and 
tankers for refrigerated gas
2. Transport ships (with cargo other than oil or gas)
3. Passenger ships (including cruise ships)
4. Fishing vessels.
Measurements of the volume of shipping within the Polar Code’s geographical area of 
application in the Arctic, taken between 2013 and 2019, show a substantial increase 
in traffic, when counting both the number of individual ships (up 25 percent) and 
the total nautical distance sailed during the six-year period in the same area (up 
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75 percent).43 Fishing vessels dominate both groups, representing more than 40 per-
cent of all ships in the Arctic area, and, of the total distance sailed, fishing vessels 
account for 45 percent.44 However, fishing vessels are neither subject to the SOLAS 
Convention nor any other international safety regulations. In 1977, IMO approved 
the Torremolinos International Convention45 but has yet to succeed in achieving rat-
ification of the protocol by enough states with large numbers of fishing vessels.46 In 
addition to fishing vessels, cargo ships of less than 500 gross tonnage, ships not pro-
pelled by mechanical means, wooden ships of primitive build, and pleasure yachts not 
engaged in trade are exempt from the safety provisions of the Polar Code (Part I).47
An increase in passenger-ship traffic in the northern areas is expected, especially 
due to reduced sea ice enabling ship traffic in open waters between the Atlantic 
and the Pacific Oceans during short periods of the year.48 In 2016 and 2017, the 
passenger ship, Crystal Serenity, sailed through the NWP from Alaska to New York, 
with more than 1,000 passengers, on its first voyage.49 The cruise industry is profit- 
driven and, to remain commercially competitive, costs related to safety equipment 
are often kept to a minimum.50 The shipbuilding industry delivering polar expedi-
tion vessels for the Arctic is peaking, with 28 new builds expected to be launched in 
the four-year period from 2018 to 2022. This is in addition to the almost 80 polar 
ships already operating with passengers in these waters.51 Moreover, the extraction 
of natural resources in the Arctic is expanding and contributing to an increase in 
bulk carrier traffic in the region.52 
5  SARex I, II & III – Studies of the Polar Code and emergency response  
in polar waters
The Norwegian Coast Guard, together with the University of Stavanger (UiS) and 
the University of Tromsø (UiT), have taken great interest in the conditions for SAR 
and evacuation operations in Arctic waters. In the SARex I, II & III exercises, per-
formed in 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively, the Coast Guard played a key role in 
the work of testing emergency response equipment with respect to requirements for 
survival, as set out in the Polar Code. In these exercises, the Polar Code was used as 
a baseline for studying emergency response equipment and personal capabilities for 
survival in real-event situations.53 Each exercise lasted for a week and was conducted 
from the Coast Guard ship, KV Svalbard, in northern areas around Svalbard. In joint 
collaborations, requirements in the regulations were used as criteria for survival and 
were examined and tested against SOLAS-certified life-saving appliances, approved 
for Arctic waters.54 Regarding performance standards, the Polar Code states that 
“Unless expressly provided otherwise, ship systems and equipment addressed in this 
code shall satisfy at least the same performance standards referred to in SOLAS”.55 
The SOLAS Convention’s mandatory requirements for merchant ships therefore 
constitute a standardized minimum of expectations for the provision of safety mea-
sures for maritime design, equipment, systems and operations. 
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5.1 SARex I
The objectives of the first SAR exercise were to identify and explore gaps between 
the functionality of existing SOLAS-certified life-saving appliances and functional 
requirements in the Polar Code.56 The exercise was a joint collaboration between the 
Coast Guard, leading experts from the industry, governmental organizations and 
academia. The exercise scenario, which took place in the marginal ice zone off the 
coast of Svalbard in late April 2016, was based on the Maxim Gorkiy accident in 
1989, where an expedition cruise ship hit drifting ice and partly sank in the marginal 
ice zone off the west coast of Svalbard.57 Focusing especially on the interpretation 
of the Polar Code’s requirements for life-saving appliances and arrangements, the 
following definition was established: “The equipment required by the Polar Code 
is to provide functionality that enables the casualty to safeguard individual safety, 
which means to maintain cognitive abilities, body control and fine motor skills for 
the maximum expected time of rescue”.58
The objectives of the exercise and the associated research program were to:59 
• Assess the adequacy of the life-saving appliances as required by the Polar 
Code. 
• Identify the gaps between SOLAS-approved rescue craft (lifeboat and life raft) 
and requirements defined in the Polar Code. 
• Identify the gaps between SOLAS-approved personal protective equipment 
(PPE) and the requirements defined in the Polar Code. 
• Assess the personal (PSK) and group survival kits (GSK) as defined by the Polar 
Code. 
• Train the Coast Guard personnel in emergency procedures in ice-infested 
waters, with particular reference to evacuation and rescue from cruise ships. 
One lifeboat and one life raft were filled with participants. Various types of stan-
dardized SOLAS-certified PPE were worn, ranging from life jackets to insulated 
survival suits. The weather conditions during the exercise were representative of 
the cruise-ship season around Svalbard, with an ambient air temperature of about 
−9°C, a water temperature of about −1°C, little wind and no clouds. The results 
from the exercise concluded that it would be unlikely that the majority of partici-
pants evacuated (to lifeboat or life raft) would have survived for a minimum of five 
days, as the Polar Code requires.60 Critical conditions occurred, as insulation from 
the cold sea water provided by the bottom of the life raft was negligible, and the 
temperature in the lifeboat dropped dramatically when engines were shut down to 
save fuel. As O2 concentrations dropped inside the lifeboat and life raft, frequent 
venting had to be maintained, lowering the air temperature inside both craft. The 
SARex I experiment demonstrated that, when tested in Arctic waters, standard 
SOLAS-certified life-saving appliances do not comply with functional requirements 
in the regulations.61 
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5.2 SARex II
The second SAR exercise was performed in Krossfjorden, North Svalbard, in May 
2017. The objective of SARex II was to test whether small investments in modifi-
cations and upgrades to life-saving appliances would be sufficient, when tested in 
the same environmental climate and conditions.62 The participants wore SOLAS- 
certified PPE of various standards. The ambient air temperature varied between 
+2°C and −9°C, while the water temperature was about +2°C. The following modi-
fications to the lifeboat and life raft had been performed:63
• Upgraded heating system in lifeboat, maintaining the temperature inside the 
craft at a reasonable level.
• Insulated seating in lifeboat, protecting from hypothermia.
• Toilet installed in lifeboat (compact carry-on design).
• Double-bottom life raft, improving insulation and ensuring an air gap to be 
maintained between seawater and floor.
• Double-layer roof in life raft, providing insulation from cold outside air tempera-
tures.
The results from SARex II were encouraging and significant, compared to the results 
from the previous exercise in 2016. Nevertheless, life-saving appliances did not meet 
the Polar Code’s goal and requirement to provide the capability for people to survive 
for five days.64 The main critical issue in the lifeboat was the buildup of CO2 from 
the participants, even though the number of Personnel On Board (POB) during the 
exercise was lower than SOLAS requirements.65 Air quality was continuously mon-
itored in both rescue craft. After approximately one day, all participants had been 
evacuated from the lifeboat, many exhausted due to lack of comfortable seating, 
minimal room for movement and insufficient emergency food rations and water. 
After 33 hours, the remaining participants in the life raft were evacuated, experienc-
ing hypothermia and fatigue.66 Following the exercises, the recommendations from 
the emergency management team were to conduct a thorough evaluation, compare 
the results with the Polar Code’s requirements and identify gaps to be closed, partly 
or fully.67
5.3 SARex III
In May 2018, the third SAR exercise was performed in Fjortende Julibukta, north of 
Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard. SARex III had three main objectives:68
1. Study functionality and identify gaps between typical PSK and GSK, regarding 
survival on ice/land, and the requirement of a minimum of five days’ survival.
2. Study the challenges when rescuing many people from land/ice.
3. Assess the functionality of utilizing Maritime Broadband Radios (MBR) to de-
velop an improved common operational picture among the different emergency 
response providers.
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The weather conditions during the exercise were favorable, with very little wind, 
some snow and rain showers during the first two days and temperatures varying 
from a maximum of 3°C to a minimum of −3°C at night.69 The first objective of the 
exercise proved to be an impossible task, due to great variations in the activity levels 
of the individual participants during the exercise, to compensate for heat loss. How-
ever, compared with findings from SARex I and SARex II, it became evident that 
there was a significant improvement in the survival rate when evacuating onto the 
shore, compared with a prolonged stay in the survival craft. One important finding 
was, furthermore, that the rations contained insufficient water for healthy survival.70 
To assess the second objective, about 50 “casualties” were evacuated from a remote 
beach onto the ship, Polarsyssel, revealing the additional challenges of managing 
many casualties with regard to time, which is a critical element in a survival situation 
in a cold climate.71 Regarding the third objective, the MBR system proved reliable, 
but significant technical expertise was needed to initiate it.72
6 The Polar Code footprints
At the time of writing (June 2020), the Polar Code has been in force for more than 
three years, and the effects of its implementation are starting to appear. The regula-
tion of ship operations in polar areas is determined by geographical and seasonal vari-
ation, which guide the choice of safety measures, equipment and systems provided.73 
Those subject to the Polar Code form a group, consisting of different parties,74 
amongst whom the owner of an oil or gas tanker does not necessarily share the same 
risk perceptions as the owner of a cruise ship with the capacity to transport several 
hundred passengers on a single voyage. Due to the Polar Code’s functionally based 
approach, compliance with the regulations can be achieved using various methods 
and measures. The SAR exercises, with the objective of exploring gaps between 
SOLAS-certified life-saving appliances and arrangements, and the Polar Code’s 
requirements for such equipment, proved that ships on polar voyages are likely to be 
equipped with insufficient survival equipment and resources.75 
6.1  Interim guidelines for life-saving appliances and arrangements for  
ships operating in polar waters
The findings from the three SAR exercises raise concerns regarding the suitability and 
efficiency of equipment provided in an emergency that requires a ship to be aban-
doned.76 Less than two years after the Polar Code was implemented, the Maritime 
Safety Committee in IMO approved (June 2019) The interim guidelines on life-saving 
appliances and arrangements for ships operating in polar waters.77 The results of the SAR 
exercises and the discussions that arose after these events contributed to the devel-
opment of the new guidelines,78 providing guidance and outlining possible means of 
mitigating hazards, in order to comply with the requirements as set out in the Polar 
Code for life-saving appliances and arrangements.79  The guidelines provide descriptive 
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guidance for food (min. 1195 kcal per person per day) and water (min. 2 liters per 
person per day), and (the prevention of long-term) exposure to CO2 concentrations 
(>5,000 ppm), for the maximum expected time of rescue. Guidelines for maintaining 
a positive metacentric height (GM), with additional ice loads (30 kg/m2 on exposed 
horizontal surfaces and 7.5 kg/m2 for the projected lateral area of each side of the life-
boat), are given for lifeboats and rescue boats, in addition to guidance and descriptions 
of the survival craft’s capacity, equipment and winterization measures deemed neces-
sary for cold climate voyages and survival. The guidelines also provide specifications 
on survival suits, protective clothing and other survival equipment, including guidance 
regarding the packing, storage and marking of such equipment.80
6.2  Regulations on the construction, equipment and operation of passenger  
ships in the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard
In (June) 2019, the NMA laid down new Regulations on the construction, equipment 
and operation of passenger ships in the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard,81 which 
came into force on 1 January 2020. With a few exceptions and additions, the reg-
ulations are the Polar Code, made applicable for passenger ships operating in the 
territorial waters surrounding Svalbard.82 Until this point, ships with national certif-
icates had been subject not to the safety provisions (Part I) of the Polar Code, but to 
MARPOL and national requirements for the certificates required to operate pas-
senger ships in Svalbard.83 The Polar Code’s safety provision applies, per definition, 
only to passenger ships (carrying more than twelve passengers) or cargo ships (with 
a gross tonnage of 500 or more) engaged in international voyages,84 where an “inter-
national voyage means a voyage from a country to which the present Convention 
applies to a port outside such country, or conversely”.85 Under the new regulations, 
passenger ships operating in the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard and passen-
ger ships engaged in international voyages calling at Svalbard fall under the scope of 
the regulations. The NMA points out that “Due to Svalbard’s judicial position,86 it 
is important to have equal rules for all flag States, predictability and clear legislation 
for ships carrying passengers in the territorial waters surrounding Svalbard”.87 
The NMA states88 that implementing the new regulations means that future devel-
opment of the legislation in Svalbard will take place in line with new legislation being 
negotiated internationally in IMO, which is an advantage point for the NMA, which 
also regulates ships flying foreign flags. In a circular,89 the NMA acknowledges the 
processes within IMO leading to the development and implementation of new con-
ventions, regulations and guidelines or changes and updates of existing ones. These 
processes are described as open and balanced, safeguarded by the opportunity for 
different interests to put forward their views before the member states lay down new 
provisions or change existing ones.90
In the comments on the individual sections,91 reference is made to the above- 
mentioned SAR exercises and recommendations from these events, which, sup-
ported by Canadian research (Transport Canada), guide the choice of life rafts, 
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requiring these to be of a type with an inflatable double bottom. In the same circular, 
the NMA points out the systematics applicable for the regulation of life-saving appli-
ances; “Performance requirements shall be supported by test or evaluation require-
ments in resolution Revised recommendation on testing of life-saving appliances”.92 But, 
due to the lack of test requirements describing the insulation properties of the raft 
floor, there are no parameters with which to measure equivalence. The NMA there-
fore decided “to lay down a requirement for an inflatable floor while waiting for the 
IMO to introduce a test standard that will ensure equivalence by establishing mea-
surable requirements for insulation properties/heat loss”.93
6.3 The Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information Forum
In response to the Polar Code’s implementation, the Arctic Council’s working group, 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), launched a public web por-
tal in 2018: The Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information Forum.94 The forum’s col-
laborative approach aims to support education, as regards implementation of the 
regulations, and to raise awareness of the Polar Code’s provisions amongst parties 
involved in or potentially affected by Arctic maritime operations.95 The goal is to 
facilitate the exchange of information and best practices on specific topics, e.g. 
hydrography, search and rescue logistics, industry guidelines and ship equipment, 
systems and structure.96 Stakeholder involvement in the forum has increased since 
start-up and includes individual governments, regional governmental bodies (Arctic 
Council/Antarctic Treaty Secretariat), international regulators (IMO), the research 
community, the maritime industry, the indigenous community, educational institu-
tions and other Arctic Council Working Groups.97 The web portal, provides submis-
sions by some of the above-mentioned stakeholders, following the chapters of the 
Polar Code, with hyperlinks to the SAR exercises, Arctic member states’ guidance on 
Arctic operations, and classification societies’ guidance and information regarding 
implementation and operations in accordance with the regulations. 
7 Discussion – Standardization as part of regulatory governance  
The tendency to adopt a goal-based standards approach in regulatory governance is 
increasing,98 with responsibility for developing definitive descriptive standards and 
guidelines being delegated from government officials to the actors and target groups 
that the regulations are intended to regulate. From a rational approach, functional 
requirements enable those subject to the regulations to choose flexible solutions best 
suited to their own business areas and activities.99 However, there is considerable 
heterogeneity among the  actors subject to the Polar Code, and we predict challenges 
in enforcement of the regulations. A centralized and international process for stan-
dardization, equal to the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) 
and the Polar Class requirements for ship structure, could provide predictability. 
Experience can be drawn from the Norwegian petroleum industry, with its extensive 
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experience in utilizing functional requirements in the standardization of complex 
operations, supported by descriptive guidelines and detailed standards.100 The condi-
tions and structures of the regulatory regime for ship operations in polar waters differ, 
however, from those of the petroleum industry; the Norwegian oil and gas industry 
consists largely of homogenous groups, and the power balance between employees, 
employers and the authorities has promoted safety-dominated practice.101
7.1  Descriptive requirements and the protection of vulnerable parties’ interests
Established structures under IMO administration regulate the international ship-
ping industry, in the form of recognized conventions, regulations and guidelines.102 
The Polar Code contains a number of operational requirements and practical safety 
measures that apply to all types of ships, regardless of construction, design and trade 
area. The regulations were developed “to supplement existing IMO instruments in 
order to increase the safety of ships’ operation and mitigate the impact on the people 
and environment in the remote, vulnerable and potentially harsh polar waters”.103
During an emergency, the functionality of life-saving appliances and arrangements 
is vital. The Polar Code sets out requirements to ensure safe escape, evacuation and 
survival in the event of abandoning ship.104 The regulations also require individual 
and shared resources to be provided for effective protection against direct wind chill, 
to ensure sufficient thermal insulation to maintain core temperature, and protection 
to prevent frostbite of all extremities.105 However, the Polar Code guidelines for pro-
tective equipment106 are vague and generic, and a variety of equipment available on 
the market is compliant, regardless of its usability under real conditions.107 The SAR 
exercises revealed that performance criteria for certified rescue equipment did not 
comply with the Polar Code’s requirements for survival, which state that “Resources 
shall be provided to support survival following abandoning ship, whether to the 
water, to ice or to land, for the maximum expected time of rescue”.108
In the event of an abandon-ship situation, a dry-shod evacuation to lifeboats, life 
rafts or onto ice or onshore is essential for survival in cold climates, and the risk of 
hypothermia, leading to frostbite and eventually death, if not mitigated, increases 
dramatically when wet.109 Maintaining thermic balance is essential for survival. It is 
determined by the body’s heat loss versus heat production, and affected by cold, wet 
and windy climate, poor clothing, lack of shelter, low activity level, and insufficient 
food and water rations.110 The new guidelines for life-saving appliances and arrange-
ments for ships operating in polar waters point out that “Survival after abandonment 
will rely on several factors, such as the types and combination of equipment, crew 
training and good leadership of each survival craft. The expected time of rescue is a 
defining factor for life-saving appliances and arrangements. Conditions that are not 
otherwise considered critical may become critical over time”.111
The lack of specifications and guidelines clarifying Polar Code requirements for 
safe escape, evacuation and survival may contribute to the great variation seen in 
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polar protective equipment.112 The new guidelines for life-saving appliances and 
arrangements put forward descriptive requirements and specifications for emergency 
equipment and systems that shipowners and operators must take into consideration 
in the planning of polar voyages.  However, the use of descriptive requirements and a 
non-flexible framework can turn out to be counter-effective, if compliance is achieved 
in a mechanical manner, with just checks and controls of predefined measures.113
7.2 Functional requirements and the use of operational risk assessments 
Utilizing a goal-based standards approach and functional requirements puts pres-
sure on the authorities and the organizations recognized by IMO to issue the Polar 
Ship Certificate. We argue that high levels of competency are required in the assess-
ment of implemented measures. One must bear in mind that achieving compliance 
with a certain requirement does not automatically ensure compliance with the over-
all goals in the associated regulation. Each company is responsible for conducting 
adequate operational risk assessments covering their own activities.114 A company 
can, however, deliberately mislead or inadvertently underestimate certain risks in 
their analyses, by predicting consequences as acceptable and/or probabilities as low 
as reasonably practicable. Certain actors may take advantage of and exploit the func-
tional requirements set out in the Polar Code, which raises questions about the role 
of the authorities.115 Experience from comparable industries has shown that thor-
ough re-verifications of conducted risk assessments rarely occur.116
Re-verification, not only of operational risk assessments but also of existing analyt-
ical tools, must be conducted to verify whether potential risks for maritime activities 
in polar waters are covered in the planning and execution of voyages. Analytical 
models quantifying risk levels should be questioned, due to the significant uncertain-
ties that exist in analysts’ risk perceptions of descriptive scenarios.117 Mechanisms for 
control and constraints, and a theoretical systemic approach118 when analyzing mar-
itime traffic in polar waters, should gain increased focus. The use of descriptive and 
detail-oriented requirements should also be evaluated, especially when uncertainties 
about phenomena increase, e.g. geography, environmental conditions or SAR oper-
ations in remote areas with limited resources. The involvement of the authorities, 
by addressing responsibilities within the industry in a competent manner, is of the 
essence, to reduce and eliminate favorable conditions for disreputable parties.119 
Previous experience from maritime disasters indicates a business sector in which the 
reputation of some members poses a challenge.120 Parallels can be drawn with the 
heavy vehicle transport industry, where research indicates that functional require-
ments are often stretched.121 
7.3 Defining norms within the IMO system
Standardization processes within IMO involving government officials, relevant par-
ties and interest organizations can be clarifying and provide predictability in the 
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enforcement of the Polar Code.122 Scientific facts can, however, be overlooked in 
favor of political points of view, as visions and goals are agreed upon amongst dif-
ferent cultures, institutions and states with competing agendas and financial sit-
uations.123 Developing new regulations can be time-consuming work, and is only 
achieved through extensive cooperation,124 as exemplified by the time (>25 years) 
it took to develop and agree on the Polar Code. The new guidelines for life-saving 
appliances and arrangements introduce design specifications and clarifications, many 
seen in correlation with findings from the above-mentioned SAR exercises.125 These 
guidelines “are intended to assist ship designers, ship-owners and ship operators, 
as well as the administrators, in the uniform implementation of the Polar Code”.126 
After the SAR exercises, it was suggested that a level of heat loss regarded as 
acceptable for the human body to maintain for the expected time to rescue and 
based on a predefined heat loss figure, should be defined, allowing equipment and 
combinations of equipment to be assessed in a transparent way.127 The new guide-
lines for life-saving appliances and arrangements recommend that manufacturers 
provide information on additional tests, including temperature ranges for which the 
equipment is intended, and that this information is included in ships’ operating and 
maintenance manuals.128
Concerns have been raised regarding non-SOLAS vessels operating in the Arctic 
region,129 as the Polar Code’s safety provisions (Part I) are not applicable to these 
vessels, and especially with respect to fishing vessels, since they constitute the largest 
overall shipping presence in Arctic waters.130 The Maritime Safety Committee and 
related sub-committees within IMO are currently looking at the application of the 
Polar Code to vessels not regulated by the SOLAS Convention. At the end of 2019 
the IMO assembly meeting adopted a resolution on interim safety measures for 
vessels not certified under the SOLAS Convention operating in polar waters, which 
urges IMO member states to implement, voluntarily, the safety provisions (Part I) of 
the Polar Code for non-SOLAS vessels.131
The web portal, The Arctic Shipping Best Practice Information Forum,132 has the 
potential to become a meeting ground for those subject to the Polar Code, facil-
itating the exchange of information, experience and best shipping practices, and 
exemplifying how to formalize enhanced knowledge on regulating ship operations in 
the Arctic Region.
8 Conclusion and summary
The implementation of mandatory regulations for ship traffic in the oceans around 
the North Pole and the South Pole is a step in the right direction, to sustain and 
protect personnel, the environment and ecosystems in vulnerable and remote parts 
of the world. Nevertheless, several issues concerning the Polar Code are highlighted 
in this article.
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People have sailed in polar waters for hundreds of years,133 and there is outstand-
ing knowledge and experience regarding risk management and the handling of haz-
ards in these waters.134 But, as new risks and hazards emerge, knowledge, experience 
and the capacity to handle these become limited, with mass tourism in polar waters 
being the main activity of concern.135 
Self-regulation is based on trust,136 and those subject to the regulations need to 
conduct thorough operational risk assessments that identify hazards, followed by 
the implementation of mitigating measures, to ensure the safe performance of ship 
operations. Experience from the Norwegian petroleum industry indicates that not 
all companies and parties pay sufficient attention to this responsibility.137  The role 
of the authorities can be demanding, and a high level of expertise, competence 
and knowledge must be acquired for assessment of company-related risks, which 
is essential in evaluations of adequacy and in the dimensioning of implemented 
measures. One concern that should be raised is practical enforcement of the Polar 
Code (verifications and audits) and the management of control mechanisms within 
the geographical area of application, to ensure compliance with the regulations. We 
assume that controls performed by the Port State and the classification societies are 
essential in this regime. The use of sanctions – fines and withdrawal of the Polar 
Ship Certificate – is a possible response to non-compliance, as well as, in extreme 
situations, the arrest of ships.138 A further study to identify the main parties involved 
in the regulation of polar ship operations in northern areas and the key elements in 
this control regime, would be enlightening.
The three SAR exercises proved that SOLAS-certified rescue equipment was not 
compliant with the Polar Code requirements for survival, necessitating a joint effort 
from the authorities and interest groups to develop provisions for the regulations, to 
ensure that life-saving appliances and arrangements meet an expected standard. The 
relatively swift establishment and implementation of the new guidelines on life-saving 
appliances and arrangements is a positive signal for future revision. Re-assessment of 
the Polar Code’s requirements for survival and the maximum expected time of res-
cue should also be addressed, for which exemptions are made when implementing 
the Polar Code for passenger ships operating in the territorial waters surrounding 
Svalbard.139  The emergency preparedness regime in Svalbard indicates that, in many 
cases, assistance will be available in less than the maximum expected time of rescue, 
and, in our opinion, it is unreasonable to require ships that only operate in the most 
central areas in Svalbard, such as Isfjord,140 to hold equipment for five-day rescue.  
Even if the minimum-number-of-days requirement is not applicable, the func-
tional requirement, as set out by the Polar Code, i.e. that every ship must be equipped 
to ensure survival for the expected time of rescue, remains. In circulars and com-
ments on the individual sections of the new regulations,141 the NMA stresses that the 
expected time of rescue may also exceed five days in Svalbard, particularly for ships 
with a large number of persons on board operating in the most remote parts of the 
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archipelago. It is therefore expected that the companies “must be able to document 
the assessments underlying the chosen time of rescue”.142 
At the time of writing, it has not been possible to obtain risk analyses or assess-
ments justifying the requirements for maximum expected time of rescue and survival 
in the case of an abandonment-of-ship situation, as set out in the Polar Code.
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